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CAUSATION IN THE NEGLIGENCE JARGON: A
PLEA FOR BALANCED "REALISM"
WALTER PROBERT*

For at least fifty years the meaning and significance of causal
language in negligence cases has been warmly debated. A variety of
experts in tort theory as well as a few in legal philosophy have set
down an amazing number of diverse views, hoping somehow to give
an ultimate clarity, maybe even to simplify the subject.1 It is not
that the judicial explanations lack in simplicity, at least of an ostensive kind, so much as any discoverable web of rationality. Some
analysts look for the pattern in the decisions all the same; some
provide their own model for posterity. There is in this effort a concern that goes beyond the subject. In the light of the display we
may catch glimpses of vital issues which transcend the causal debates.2
It would be fatuous indeed to lay claim to some rational solvent
for the misunderstandings, confusions, and disagreements. Yet comment on some of the key divergencies is in order, less to criticize than
*B.S. 1948, J.D. 1951, University of Oregon; J.S.D. 1957, Yale University; Member of Oregon Bar; Professor of Law, University of Florida.
1. Most often cited as general authority by the courts are: HARPER & JAMES,
TORTS §§20.1-.6 (1956), see n. 4, ibid for suggestive list of earlier writings; PROSSER,
TORTS §41 (3d ed. 1964) [hereinafter these works will be cited as HARPER & JAMES
and PROSSER respectively]; REsTATEmENT, TORTS ch. 16 (1933).
Some of the current debaters are: BEcr & MILER, THE TEsr OF FACrUAL
CAUSATION

IN NEGLIGENCE AND STRIcr LuIAmrrY CASE

(1961); HART & HONORE,

CAUSATION IN THE LAw (1959); KErrON, LEGAL CAUSE IN THE LAW OF TORTS (1963);
Cole, Windfall and Probability: A Study of Cause in Negligence Law, 52 CAL. L.
REV. 459, 764 (1964); Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60
MICH. L. REv. 542 (1962); Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L. Rnv.
60 (1956) [hereinafter these works will be cited as BEcr & M.ER, HART &
HONORE, KEETON, Cole, Green, and Malone respectively].
On the constitutional debate see, for instance, Miller & Howell, The Myth of
Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 27 U. Cm. L. REv. 501 (1959).
2. There are significant parallels with the louder debate over the nature of
constitutional law and the function of the Supreme Court whether, for instance,
its decisions have a sufficient basis of reasoned principles. See Miller & Howell, The
Myth of Neutrality in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 27 U. Cm. L. REv. 501 (1959);
Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 36 COLUM. L. RV. 1001 (1965).
Both debates interplay with the even larger themes of the jurisprudential literature. Some of these themes will be raised hereafter. The hope of the author is
that this article will demonstrate the relevance of jurisprudential perspectives to
substantive law generally, as well as add creditably to the causal inquiry spedfically.
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to place them in perspective; and this is so from the point of view of
one interested in the substance of tort law as well as the judicial decisional process generally.
We will examine causation in negligence cases, but not to discover
what the law is on that subject, as "law" is usually understood. The
major premise is instead that an analyst of the common law is first
and necessarily an interpreter. Causation does not exist pure, but in
a variety of contexts. Even for those who get their tort causation in
its purest form, through contact mainly or only with judicial opinions,
the causal product is a derivative of interpretation. The inevitability
of interpretation implies that each reading or translation is colored at
least slightly by the point of view of the reader. Still, this will not
end up a plea merely for some relativistic view of causation. Far from
it. The corollary of the basic premise is that maximum objectivity
will come only through a candid appraisal of the frame of reference
3
through which interpretation has gone.
So it is that we expect opposing lawyers to have different understandings of a key opinion. A judge must interpret -even his own
written opinions - and will automatically bring his role to bear, providing a uniquely different context for the interpretation from a
teacher, critic, or mere observer. We generally do not emphasize these
variations through our language, partly because of tradition, partly
because of deeper contrary assumptions. However, there are clues
accentuating the variations, often ignored, sometimes visible to only
the wariest of interpreters. Even so, we find a precision in high order
abstractions, mainly by letting our own values flow into the words,
4
perhaps more as a matter of need than of carelessness.
All the same, there may be some needless confusions, even illusions, which have crept into our public interpretations. The arguments on how much causation is or ought to be a question of fact and
on the degree of relevancy of values or "policy" tend to some extent
to show an unjustified faith in our underdeveloped nonmathematical
legal language. The arguments tend too much to assume that "facts"
are outside one's skin and that "values" are on the inside, without
stopping to consider that as terms, these words are sufficiently variant
in use to refer outside or inside or both at the same time. To say
that causation is policy neutral - pure fact - says as much about the
speaker as it does about causation5
3.

For a more detailed presentation of this position see F. S. Cohen, Field

Theory and Judicial Logic, 59 YALE L.J. 238 (1950), including a discussion of
causation in torts. Id. at 251-59.
4. F. S. Cohen, What is a Question, 39 MONIST 350 (1929), reprinted in
3 (1960).
5. In one way or another, tort causation is viewed as a fact question devoid
of policy considerations in BECHT & MILLER and HART & HONORE. Contra, COHEN,
COHEN, THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol18/iss3/1

2

1965]

Probert: Causation in the Negligence Jargon: A Plea for Balanced "Realism"
CAUSATION IN THE NEGLIGENCE JARGON

Such a pure fact view lags far behind the general recognition that
appellate courts cannot state the "objective facts" of cases. Most analysts now admit that stated facts are partly the product of litigation
itself, having varied somewhat at each stage of the litigation, as such
stimuli as evidence, citations, and arguments push through the varying
frames of reference of each judge, juror, and reader. There is no
guarantee at any stage, much less at the stage of interpretation of an
opinion, that the "facts" are immediately referable to some identifiable
objective happenings. If substantial agreement about causation is a desired goal, we must somehow take account of the variations between
the "cold facts" of the record and the dynamics of litigation.6
An overriding way of viewing this sort of problem is to recognize
that generally we are committed to our definitions. Such commitment
will affect the reader's reaction to the subsequent analysis. Not that
it is "just a matter of semantics," for as much involved are varying
ideologies and goals. Yet it will help a serious student, at least in
this and other studies of causation, if he will allow himself some
brief luxury of noncommitment. A major persuasive technique of the
legal profession is the subtle manipulation of attitudes toward the
advocate's preferred goals by the use of familiar word patterns. At
least a temporary willingness to delay commitment to a particular
definition of a term or phrase is necessary to allow the technique of
7
interpretation here suggested to come through.
Seven cases will be analyzed in application of the preceding remarks. They have been selected because they have received varied
interpretations and because they illustrate key problem areas. Some
of them appear as key cases in Professor Robert Keeton's recent important work on causation, Legal Cause in the Law of Torts.s His
view will be unfolded during the analysis and compared in its stages
with some of the competing analyses. The Keeton view is selected for
its claim that its risk interpretation is the predominant strain in the
American law of proximate cause and because it is representative
of a contemporary legal philosophy which in some important ways
seems antithetical to contemporary socio-realism.
Although these key cases will be summarized and interpreted in
op. cit. supra note 4; Malone, Cole.
6. The expression "cold facts" comes from Louis Brown whose emphasis is on
"live" facts; see Brown, The Case of the Re-Lived Facts, 48 CALIp. L. REv. 448
(1960); CooPER, LIVING THE LAW (1958).
7. The writer believes that the technique of interpretation applied here is appropriate to analysis of any area of common law. For elaboration see STEvENSON,
ETHics AND LANGUAGE 210 (1944); Probert, Law and Persuasion, The Language
Behavior of Lawyers, 108 U. PA. L. Rav. 35 (1959); Williams, Language and the
Law, 61 L.Q. REv. 71, 179, 293, 384 (1945).
8. KYETON.
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this study, the reader would find maximum advantage in referring to
the original reports to test the interpretations. The test is not necessarily in terms of the degree of agreement, but reasons for disagreement. More important, what clues does each interpretation itself give
to the frame of reference of the interpreter? 9
EXAMINING CAUSE IN FACT

According to the leading authorities, the first step in clarifying
proximate cause is to split it into two parts: (1) simple cause in fact;
(2) the variety of rules or tests or policies which limit liability, often
called legal cause for convenience of reference.10 This way of putting
the matter is more in the nature of a translation of the judicial
language than a description of it. An example which at once illustrates
and tests the theory is Ford v. Trident Fisheries."' The "facts" of this
and the other key cases appear in footnote form. As the court put it,
even if these facts amount to negligence, "there is nothing to show
they in any way contributed to Ford's death." This explanation is
translatable into the famous "but for" test to show absence of causal
connection.12

If the four corners of the opinion are examined, in context, the
case exemplifies the significance of the "facts" variable in interpretation: (1) the cold facts illusion; (2) relation of facts to values; (3)
interrelation of choice of causal characterization with choice or
manipulation of facts.
If an interpreter focuses on the defendant, particularly on his
claimed negligence, he tends to lose sight of the full dynamics of
events leading to the claimed injury. Out of court, as it were, we
readily recognize that there were numerous contributing factors or
physical causes in this case. They may be reasonably inferred from
the court's own fact statement. Among others would be the weather
conditions, the sea, the "force" of gravity, the decedent himself, his
9. In many tort classes, interpretive skills are doubtless being underplayed.
Increasingly students learn to read cases only while they run, usually much edited
versions, shaped to a particular view.
10. HARPER & JAMES; PROSSER; RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS (1965).
11. 232 Mass. 400, 122 N.E. 389 (1919), a key case in SEAVEY, KFETON &
KEETON, TORTS 193 (2d ed. 1957). Wrongful death of mate of defendant fishing

vessel. Thrown overboard by roll of vessel. Rescue boat not in a ready position
and only one oar. Decedent not seen after fall. No proof that he could have
been saved. Directed verdict affirmed.
12. PROSSER 242-43; Cole 771-79; GREGORY & KALvEN, TORTS 6, n.l (1959). A
dearer example of "but for" would be a defendant who was in no way "involved"
in the chain of events with no obligation to be involved or any possibility of
preventing the harm.
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employment, the ship, the defendant in employing decedent, their
putting out to sea, and so on.
Yet common sense will possibly reject our using or shifting this
viewpoint into the legal analysis. While it should not, common sense
may claim violation of some inherent meaning of "cause"; or it may
leap ahead, more likely, to see where such a definition will take it.
Probably there will be an intuitive resistance to listing defendant as
a cause, certainly as the cause, because in the context of the court's
language, at least, that seems to mean responsibility and liability.13
See how clearly that attitude may be caught in the statement that
defendant's negligence (not his total conduct) did not cause the death.
Yet if that be a fact statement, it is a choice from among several factual statements or characterizations. Choice implies some basis, some
kind of evaluation.
On this strong attitudinal base Robert Keeton has built his house
of risk. However, he splits its levels through use of sometimes broad
and other times narrow characterizations of the actor's conduct.
Using a broad characterization, he would readily interpret the presence of "simple" causation in the Ford case: defendant's conduct, his
total conduct, did in fact cause decedent's death.34 Next under the
Keeton approach is the search for "legal cause in fact." Now the
narrow factual characterization applies. Thus, query: Did the "as-

pects" of defendant's conduct which were claimed to have made his
conduct negligent - the omissions regarding the rescue boat - in fact
cause the death? s By this step, according to this interpretive technique, we have characterized the facts so as to facilitate a risk evaluation of the case. In the Ford situation, defendant took the risk that
decedent would die for lack of a reasonable means of rescue. However, that was not the actual turn of events. Therefore, there was no
legal cause in fact. That was what the court's words meant when it
said that defendant had not contributed to decedent's death. While
Keeton would not likely regard his two-barrelled translation as a
linguistic simplification in a quantitative sense, still it is arguably a
13. In earlier years, the author was "cordially" hissed by his students for
attributing causation to defendant in the Ford case.
14. Keeton does not use the Ford case for this point, instead he uses a hypothetical variation of Larrimore v. American Nat'1 Ins. Co., 184 Okla. 614, 89
P.2d 340 (1939) in order to eliminate "possible grounds of decision other than
those to which attention is directed here." KFa=oN 125, n.1. The argument of
this article is that such editing creates an illusion.
15. Green objects to the traditional reliance on omissions to establish the
relation. Green 546, n.1; see also HARPER & JAMEs §20.5, n.17. Bacsn & MnwmR
§2 justify use of omissions in terms of "hypothetical cause." "It is now thought
at least in England, that there is no special difficulty about omissions." HART &
HoNoRE 131, n.l. Preference on this matter, particularly regarding one's freedom
to choose omission characterizations, has value implications.
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clarification for it helps to show that the court was using causal
language in other than the descriptive mode which a quick reading
might imply.
There is yet another interpretation of this case. The court affirmed
a directed verdict. Focus on that corner of the opinion and you see
a possible insufficiency of evidence problem. The "cold facts" of the
court may involve an inference based on an over-all evaluation of
the case. Certainly they are not objectively provable. The casual
observer may see no other reasonable inference, but one who has
read related cases, or maybe had related life experiences, will perhaps
see other available inferences. Such is the approach of Wex Malone
to this and similar cases. 16 He suggests that rescue operations at sea
often bring later conflicting factual reports or none at all. Given a
different attitude, a different policy choice or valuation of the evidence, the plaintiff has at least a prima facie case, as he would today
under contemporary legislation and common law approaches.
There are other clues within the opinion which will further
stimulate the interpreter of a receptive frame of reference. An additional claim of negligence involved a missing guard rail on the
steps from which decedent was thrown while moving to the pilot
house.17 In language akin to that of assumption of risk, the court saw
no duty to change an obvious condition, known by the decedent for
two months. In a different era, the missing guard rail, the lashed
down rescue boat, and a missing oar easily add up to negligence and
an allowable inference of cause even in the Keeton sense, an unreasonable increase of risk sufficient to put the defendant to its
chances with the jury.' 8
This has been only an illustration of the way in which competing
causal theories may arise. The dogma or transcendent value of any
one of them may be at least cast in doubt. The question must be
raised whether transcendent or overriding principles can ever be
found in the stream of decisions through either an exclusively abstract or an exclusively ad hoc approach.
THE VALUE OF CAUSATION

Routine events lead to routine explanations and expectations. If
the causal relation could be taken for granted, then we might call
the relation merely a "fact." "A negligently shoots B to death" is
16.

Malone.

17. Purposely omitted from note 11 supra, to make the interpretive point.
Also omitted from SF-AvEv, KEETON & KEETON, op. cit. supra note 11.
18. See Reynolds v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 37 La. Ann. 694 (Sup. Ct. 1885) (badly
lighted stairs); Prince v. Chehalis Say. & Loan Ass'n, 186 Wash. 372, 58 P.2d 290
(1936) (fire trap, source of fire unknown).
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somewhat equivalent to "A is responsible for B's death." That in
turn is somewhat equivalent to "A is in fact a cause of the death,
and we will hold him responsible." Then we believe we may separate the fact (cause) from the value (responsibility), forgetting that
the fact arose somewhere in time out of a value judgment, a need, the
social structure, a common reaction. Nonroutine cases do not so much
test the routine of the past facts as they do the routine valuation.
Summers v. Tice-9 is such a case as it appears in the reports. It is
a case which tests the doctrine (routine valuation) and exposes something of the "function" if not the "meaning" of causation.
The opinion defies a single interpretation. The transcendentalist
will have to ignore some portion of the court's remarks. Most commentators focus on the injury to the eye and interpret the court's
varied remarks as involving a shift of the burden of proof on the
causal issue. 20 In this comparatively routine explanation lies a fiction,
but it satisfies. It satisfies the expectation that there must be causation
of the routine kind even though such cold facts imply that one of
the defendants could not possibly have hit plaintiff in the eye.
The four corners of any opinion, as here, show the commitment
of the court. Joint and several liability is not novel in comparable
situations, comparable if shaped to fit the commitment now to be
justified and made transcendent. 21 A justification calls for valuations
which fit the case and yet transcend the ad hocs of the case. Breach
of duty was in issue, but the acts apparently speak for them/iselves.
Causation may not be so readily value-inferred, but it must be found
or the opinion will appear arbitrary. Plaintiff must be compensated
but one defendant cannot be singled out. The trial judge found both
defendants liable, despite evidence available for holding one defendant
for the contact. 22 The judge is presumed to know the routine of law
on causation as well as on credibility of evidence. So all the fact
findings, and that includes cause, are shaped (fictionalized) toward
those assumptions.
Perhaps the trial judge believed that evidence but held the second
defendant liable without routine causation. After all, the second
19. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948). Hunting party of plaintiff and the two
defendants. Defendants both shot at quail rising between them and plaintiff who
was struck in face by one pellet and by another, the major damage, in the eye.
Defendants held jointly and severally liable at trial. No jury.
20. PROSSER 247, n.52; HARPER & JAMEs §10.1, nn.66, 68. If both eye and
cheek injuries are considered, the case pulls even harder toward an apportionment
analogy.
21. HARPER & JAMEs §20.3 compare indivisible injury cases in which apportionment is impossible.
22. Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, at 2-3. The appellate court speculates that
the trial judge rejected the credibility of that evidence. But see next paragraph of
above text.
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defendant took the same risks as the first defendant. He was as
"guilty," as much at fault. "But for" the Grace of God his shot
would have hit instead. 23 Further, he was sufficiently involved to say
that his negligence was not "in the air." If defendant two had not
been there, defendant one and plaintiff would probably not have been
either, or at least the injury possibly would not have occurred. In
the broad characterization, the second defendant's conduct causedsubstantially contributed to- the injury, even if in a narrow sense
24
his specific shot did not.

The interpretation may seem far fetched, but it is also supported
by language in the opinion. The language is sufficiently ambiguous
to support a joint venture theory or a notion of plural causes or
both. The court justifies a finding that "their negligence" was the
"legal cause" of the injury, the very kind of language that Keeton
translates into risk theory. The trial judge had the combined discretions of judge and jury. Clearly he could have reached a different
conclusion, at least on the facts; but having concluded as he did, he
is now ratified.
Of most importance, the opinion shows there is sufficient flexibility in the syntax of negligence doctrine and within the definitional
variations of causation to meet the value pressures of "the justice" of
the case.2 5 We will not expect a court to use this flexibility at the
drop of a hat, however. We may predict that trial courts will be given
such discretion at the firing of a gun,2 6 the running of a hospital, 27
or even the driving of a car, 28 for instance.

So here is another opinion offering a rich variety of clues. Too
often we close our rationality off from even those clues which could
stimulate a second or third interpretation, usually because of some
commitment of our own, our individual frame of reference. 29 Speculations on why we may do so lie mostly in the realms of philosophy
and psychology.
23. Compare Kingston v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 191 Wis. 610, 211 N.W. 913
(1927) (involving concurrent sufficient causes).
24. See lengthy and involved analysis of Summers in BEciIT & MILLER at 117.
The authors seem bedevilled by this case since for them causation is only "factual."
25. Cf. Laidlaw v. Sage, 158 N.Y. 73 (1899). Defendant protected himself
against injury from explosives by using plaintiff as a shield. No causation. Unless
rugged individualism is the moral test, today causation would and should be found,
letting defendant pay for benefit received. Under the very attitude of the case,
plaintiff could have been justified in using defendant as a shield, and "but for"
defendant's conduct, he might have.
26. Malone 81.
27. Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944).
28. Micelli v. Hirsch, 83 N.E.2d 240 (Ohio App. 1948). Two drivers successively ran over decedent. Joinder allowed even though proof of precise cause of
death impossible.
29. The Summers case has precedent value as an example of activity-cause.
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DmEcrr CAUSATION AND THE DIALECTIC
The bifurcation of proximate cause has created some further
classification problems of its own, perhaps because the very split is
tenuous. There are many cases not classified as simple cause examples
which have been classified as illustrations of the direct causation test.30
Keeton has allocated most of his legal cause category to the risk
characterization. The direct causation cases constitute a major deviation.31 Some of the problems associated with the logic of this frame
of reference are raised by interpretation of Ehrgott v. Mayor of the
33
City of New York, 32 Keeton's lead example of a direct causation case.
Summaries of arguments of counsel show that one of the major
issues in the case concerned an evaluation of plaintiff's behavior, not
only whether he was contributorily negligent, but also, if he was not,
was he the "sole" or proximate cause, or in today's language of the
Restatement, a superseding cause. 4 The court in that year apparently
was not yet taking for granted that other contributing causes could
be ignored and defendant singled out and held liable for the total
damages. The jury specifically found that the spinal disease was
caused by the fall over the dashboard and the exposure to the weather.
The court rejected defendant's argument that if defendant was not
responsible for plaintiff's exposure, then if there could not be apportionment, there should be no recovery.3 5 This is a basic problem
which arguably is involved in all cause cases. A defendant never
causes all the claimed harm, that is, his conduct is always in combiCompare respondeat superior, warranty, workmen's compensation, and res ipsa
loquitur.
30. PROSSER 303-05; HARPER &JAMES 1155-56 both point out that there is some

limit to liability for direct consequences, even where the test is used. Probably the
duty limit will be best used.
31. This deviation is a leading contender to the supremacy of risk. It is discussed in KErON 28-36 under the heading "order and nature of antecedents"
rules. Cf. the several exceptions to the risk rule, such as the "thin skull" or "old
soldier" cases, id. at 60-73. It is only in reference to these exceptions that Keeton
sees any justification for talking about matters other than cause.
32. 96 N.Y. 264 (1884). Plaintiff drove horses and carriage into ditch in road;
carriage broken and plaintiff carried partly over dashboard, suffering shock and
strain. Exposed to rain and cold. Drove another carriage home while wet.
Permanent spinal disease. Jury verdict including loss of profits from job as
salesman.
33. Keeton is highly critical of the direct causation test, partly because of its
"deviant" from risk nature, partly as a semantic matter.
34. PESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TORTS §§440-52 (1965), not using "direct" or
"indirect," but "intervening" and "superseding," which seem to add up to the
same idea.
35. Even if plaintiff was reasonable in not coming in out of the rain there
is an apportionment question to be faced. Given a comparative negligence statute,
the probable disposition is quite different.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1965

9

Florida Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 3 [1965],
Art. 1
[Vol. XVIII

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

nation with some other contributions. The "but for" test does not
capture this inevitable evaluational problem, the problem which was
also present in the Ford and Summers cases. The problem is probably
ignored in the run of cases even with the alternative test of simple
cause which asks if defendant substantially contributed to plaintiff's
damage. 36
The court used "but for" and "direct causation" language, but
in light of the complexity of the facts and the apportionment problem,
"direct" hardly amounts to a test. It almost certainly has to be a conclusion-stating or evaluative word. Moreover, one interpretation states
that this case is not merely an exception to the risk approach, it is
3
an outright rejection of it.
7 Yet, comparison of this case with the

first two illustrative cases shows that if there is any justification in regarding them as examples of simple cause in fact, there is here too.
If "directness" is not just a "value" clue, a means of emphasis, then
it is arguably a spurious issue altogether.38
One who has no commitment to a particular theory may prefer to
see the risk and the direct cause characterizations as different slices
of the dialectic pie. Arguably, the court in this case rejected the foreseeability formula because the results clearly were not foreseeable as
that word was then being used. The court could bring defendant's
hole in the road into close "proximity" to plaintiff's harm by its
characterization of the events, by evaluating plaintiff as a kind of
pawn of the defendant.39 Intellectual proximity was indispensable in
those days just coming out of the "last human wrongdoer" era of
0

evaluation.4

Today we may call this a "foreseeable" result. Option is built into
the vagueness and ambiguity of the word, in its common sense as well
as its policy references. Directness is no longer as much needed.41
36. PROSSER 244; RESTATEMENT (SEcOND), TORTS §§435-39 (1965); Green; Malone. BECHT & MILLER 130-41 criticize the "substantial" factor test as involving an
evaluation. Malone at 62-67 has this same criticism. Of course it doesl See elaborate discussion of this problem in Cole, especially at 771-79.
37. HART & HONORE 240, n.l. The authors are generally opposed to a faultrisk analysis because it would cut off liability for almost all "ulterior" harm, such
as in Ehrgott.

38. G. Williams has suggested "direct" is a synonym for "important"; in his
terms an "emotive" word, in our terms, a "value" word, Williams, Language and
the Law, 62 L.Q. REV. 387 (1946).

39. Cf. Hines v. Morrow, 236 S.W. 183 (Civ. App. Tex. 1921). Another hole
in road; most unusual circumstances and injuries. Court manipulated chain of
events also, but in terms of "foreseeability."
40. Counsel for defendant in Ehrgott cited "last human wrongdoer" cases in
support.
41. Fleming, The Passing of Polemis, 39 CAN. B. REv. 489, 497 (1961), sees
"directness" and "foreseeability" simply as available formulae for reaching "fair
and acceptable" results. Cf. KEETON 41.
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Whether we regard it as the kind of risk which stimulated the court
to characterize the defendant city as negligent, a slight shift in
reference allows us to call it a risk of a defective road - and the result
a risk of municipal42 activity.
THE STATUTORY ANALOGY

"Proximate cause" provides a means of limiting liability. Under
this heading a variety of policies may be put into play. According
to Keeton, however, there is usually only one policy to be considered
at this stage. That policy is embraced within the risk analysis. 43 The
technique of the risk analysis is most dearly discernible in cases involving statutory standards. We may abbreviate the comparison as
the "statutory analogy"; what courts most dearly do in statutory cases
they also do but less dearly in common law cases in which only the
reasonable-man rule is available.
Keeton uses one of the favorite statutory analogy cases, Gorris v.
Scott.4 4 Even assuming that the neglect to provide the pens required

by the regulation was "the reason" for the loss of the sheep, 45 the
plaintiff still had no civil action because the statute was not aimed at
this "evil." The statute was designed to regulate the carriers only for
the particular purpose of preventing the spread of contagious diseases.
Note this seeming precision in the characterization of the scope of
the statutory "purpose," because precision in characterization presents
the major obstacle to the application of the Keeton theory - as well
as to acceptance of it as a valid line of interpretation.
His translation is somewhat more complicated. He too would
assume simple causation, but in the broad characterization of "loss in
transportation." Legal causation is to be found, if at all, in the relation between the loss and the defendant's conduct as narrowly characterized: the omission to provide pens. At this point, the Keeton kind
42. The case can be translated into risk theories, either that of Keeton or of
Green, note 105 infra raising the question how important the so-called tests are.
A policy analysis of the case is also possible, particularly in light of the municipal
nuisance statute involved and the court's lengthy analysis of that problem. See
subsequent treatment of Brown v. Shyne, note 53 infra.
43. KEE ON 16-17. While KEErON, BE HT & MiLER and HART & HONOIE thus

attempt to eliminate policy questions from at least the causal area, their techniques
seem hopelessly at odds.
44. L.R. Ex. 125 (1874). Plaintiff's sheep swept overboard from defendant
carrier ship by sea. Order of Privy Council, pursuant to Contagious Diseases
(Animals) Act, to carry sheep in pens, had been violated. Analyzed in K=ErON
14-16. See also GREGORY & KALVEN, op. cit. supra note 12, at 317; Gorris is cited
as leading case in HARPER & JAMES, §17.6 n.31.

1 45. Calling "cause" a fact has numerous procedural and strategic implications.
In Gorris, for instance, the court assumes cause because it was pleaded and there
was a demurrer.
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of analysis would seem to lead to a finding of legal cause, since if
the required pens had been used, the sheep probably would not have
been washed overboard. 46 A further refinement is involved, however.
He now isolates the particular "quality" of the physical aspect of the
total conduct which constitutes the violation. In the Gorris case, the
physical aspect is in not providing pens. The quality is which would
prevent disease. Put them together and they do not stand in a legal
causal relation to the loss. In the same way, the driver who while
of
speeding hits a pedestrian will not be regarded as the legal cause
47
impact.
the
avoided
have
not
could
driver
the harm if a proper
An interpretation coming from the forum of Gorris rejects outright
the statutory cases as suitable analogies for the problem of common
law causation. In this view, causation is policy neutral, whereas
statutes provide problems of construction (interpretation), always
resting on policy considerations (of the legislature, probably). Further, there is no general formula for the statutory cases, although
there is, according to this view, regarding the causal issue. 48
The mere judicial application of a particular statutory standard,
according to yet another viewpoint, at minimum requires a judicial
decision, or choice, or policy implementation. So it would in Gorris
even had the sheep been damaged from disease, since no civil liability
was mentioned in the act. At any rate, we may see that the way we
view the court's role in the statutory cases may itself become a variable
in our interpretations when we are analyzing common law negligence
cases. Use of a policy-oriented (legislative and judicial policy) statuof such cases which are
tory analogy could lead to interpretations
49
widely variant from the Keeton theme.

46. HARPER & JAMES 1138 n.15 finds a causal relation between defendant's
fault and the injury. Yet KEE'rON at 13 sees support in their statements.
47. The distinction between "physical" and "qualitative" aspects is elaborated
in KEEroN 126 n.11. There he contrasts the BEcHT & MILLER approach. If the
general reference of "fact" can be so varied, why not in a specific case? In terms
of metaphysical assumptions, is there really much to choose between Keeton's
"qualities," the Restatement's "superseding" forces, and Beale's "active" forces?
Beale, The Proximate Consequences of an Act, 33 HARV. L. REv. 633 (1920).
"Qualities" are not things or parts of things. Even assuming that cause-in-fact
might have some consistent operational reference, the referent of a "quality" is
subject to the discretion of the defining party, or at best a value or policy matter.
See further critical analysis in Cole 503-05.
48. HART & HONoRE at 88. In their view, causation is a way of limiting liability
that is not relevant to the Gorris kind of problem. The commentaries are full of
this kind of projection of personal preference.
49. In applying criminal statutes, courts are, arguably, effecting some kind
of judicial not just legislative policy. They may range from most restrictive to
most expansive, Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. Rav. 383 (1908).
Choice between purpose (duty and causation characterization bear on that policy).
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We need, then, to examine the statutory situation somewhat further. If we look at statutes of the kind involved in Gorris as regulatory, and if we can see that potential civil liability has some regulatory
impact, at least in the carrier situation, we can see a policy question
regarding the desirability of regulating shippers in certain ways. In
the Gorris situation, for instance, prevention of disease might arguably be for the protection of ultimate consumers, among others.
Civil liability to the shipper might all the same be a desirable additional penalty. Yet another policy question is raised regarding the
appropriate mechanism of economic "risk" distribution."0 Perhaps
the parties should be left to private economic control by contract and
insurance, even for sheep washed overboard. Assuming that developing judicial patterns, one way or another, in this kind of situation,
are also of policy significance, a decision maker would justifiably look
at other carrier cases, with and without statutes, to discover evolving
policies. While the court may not be explicit about its policy bases,
the interpreter may discover dues, particularly if he attempts to place
the opinion in that same stream of decisions context. 51
Such interpretive technique is not any easier. Indeed it may on
the whole be harder. Certainly choices still have to be made. Policy
variables are possibly as sticky as the causal variables we are emphasizing. There are definitional problems also. Life is like that. To
many interpreters they seem unmanageable, even chaotic, and often
irrelevant.52 Yet to others they seem at least to the point and often
of predominant importance. However we may view the matter, pro
or con or in between, if we are to understand the interpretations and
use them to maximum advantage, we must look for clues to the interpreters' attitudes on policy, for they vitally affect his interpretations
- and ours.
SYNTAX AND HIDDEN POLICIES

Perhaps we would do better to look for transcendent attitudes
rather than principles. We have seen one example of the sufficient
Cf., Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 855 U.S. 426 (1958)) (suit under Coast
Guard regulation, refusing to use statutory purpose limitation) (compare this
case with Gorris); DeHaen v. Rockwood Sprinkler Co., 358 N.Y. 350, 179 N.E.
764 (1932) (class of hazards); Ross v. Hartman, 189 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
50. See analysis of risks theories, notes 62-111 infra.
51. Such a situation approach is used in GREEN, MALONE, PEDRICK, and RAHL,
TORTS (1957), a casebook. Gorris is cited in the section on Freight Transportation.
See Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Elmore & Stahl, 32 U.S.L. WEEK 4379 (1964), for an
example of today's complicated network of statute, rules, presumptions, placing
the burden on the carrier to prove "what caused" the loss of the goods in
question.
52. Momus, ToRTs 210 (1953), scorning the usefulness of "policy" as guide
to proper solutions.
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flexibility of causal principles to reinforce an imposition of liability.
We need to see how these definitions can be used in an opposite
manner. Such a case is Brown v. Shyne.53 It provides a good bridge
from the statutory analogy to the common law negligence cases, since
both frameworks are involved, but almost hopelessly intertwined by
the majority opinion. It is an opinion that has been taken much too
seriously by the commentators in an attempt to unravel "its nonrationality." As a policy implementation, it makes arguable good
sense. 54 As an addition to negligence syntax, it is a caricature. For
that reason it will again dramatize the functions our doctrine may
serve. The dissent is almost a masterpiece in logic and policy explanation, but it has not caught the attention of the major commentators.
Simply enough, its attitude is wrong, that is, unpopular.
The evidence was conflicting on both the negligence and causal
issues. Plaintiff's verdict was overturned by the court order of a new
trial, based on the trial judge's error in charging that the statutory
violation was evidence of negligence. According to the majority,
since the statute was "designed" only to protect the public from injury caused by unskilled practitioners, the plaintiff had to prove that
the defendant was unskilled, apparently by expert testimony. No
other justification of a policy kind was given, except such as may lurk
behind the manipulation of "cause" and "negligence."
Whatever its rationale, this court could not avoid having some
kind of impact on the regulatory program of the legislature, by implementing its policy in some degree of harmony or by clashing with
it. It chose the latter, perhaps in ignorance, but probably not. The
court's very definition of the statutory purpose must have been in
part a decision on the judicial policy involved. Majority and dissent
"found" different statutory purposes. A number of attitudinal variations were possible, each one of which could find its outlet through
some "appropriate" definition. The dissenting judge's attitude toward
53. 242 N.Y. 176, 151 N.E. 197 (1926). Defendant chiropractor treated plaintiff
for laryngitis, with evidence that paralysis resulted from the bodily manipulations.
Defendant lacked license from Regents. Statute prohibited practice of medicine
without such license.
54. Every decision not only has immediate impact on the parties to the case,
but also has potential impact to some extent on the society. These impacts constitute one permissible reference for the vague and ambiguous word "policy." See

elaboration in Probert, Creative Judicial Sanctioning: Application in the Law of
Torts, 49 IOWVA L. REv. 277 (1964). The Brown case is used here to help tie
causation with that analysis. The sanctioning impact of the Brown decision is
more obvious than many others. Even so, commentators deal little with that
aspect. Cf., Green at 548 n.1, showing possible impact on the legislative program.
GREGORY &cKALVEN note generally that "licensing statutes . . . although designed
for safety, are not really relevant." Teachers Reference Guide at 16 for GREGORY
& KALVEN, ToRTs (1959). Is "relevancy" subject to verification as if a fact?
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chiropractic medicine was dearly negative, at least given the statutory
prohibition. He would have preferred to impose civil liability on
the basis of the statute without resort to negligence syntax or by
means of the negligence per se fiction. The trial judge's approach
constituted a lesser, but still cooperative implementation of the likely
statutory purpose, or of that purpose found by the majority, for that
matter.
What the majority's attitude was is not so clear: in favor of chiropractic medicine, opposed to implementing this statute or this kind
of statute, or what. In effect the majority used negligence syntax to
obscure its attitude, by tradition a legitimate technique. The first
hiding of the ball was accomplished in causal terms. The requisite
causal relation was held missing because the mere failure to have a
license could not have caused the paralysis. 55 Contrast the dissenting
characterization: the defendant's unauthorized treatment of the plaintiff obviously caused the harm. We may say that the causal issue was
spurious,5 6 or that cause is policy neutral,5 7 but if we do, we ignore
the value consequences following and probably the value judgments
preceding. The word "cause" is neutral-like a bullet.58 The relationship it refers to, on the other hand, as shaped in each judge's
opinion, fitted the occasion and the discovered statutory purpose as
viewed by that judge.
The second diversionary definition of the majority involved the
word "negligence." Not only was there the wide range of possible
purpose characterizations available, as in all statutory cases, but also
there was the range of characterizations of the common law standard,
not just in combination, but in permutation. In qaying that the violation of the statute (negligence1 ) was not evidence of negligence 2
(common law standard) the court decided two major issues at once:
(a) denying the mild sanctioning implementation offered by the trial
judge; (b) denying the permissible inference of unreasonableness or
lack of medical skill which is raised by the lack of license. 55
The foregoing interpretation may run against the reader's own
attitudes regarding the chiropractic question, the judicial role, or
even the respect due an opinion which is in the majority. The re55. This and other explanations are discussed at length in BEcrr &
144-50.
56. Green at 548 n.10. Cf. Cole, Part II n.21 and accompanying text.
57.

MILLER

HART & HONORE.

58. The word may be more like a gun: ready to be loaded. It is also adjustable
in calibre to that of the "risk" or "conduct" as characterized by the loader.
59. This can be called confusion of levels of abstraction whether it is purposeful or not. HAYAKAWA, LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT IN ACTION 171-229 (2d ed. 1964);
Probert, Law, Logic, and Communication, 9 WEsr. R.s. L. REV. 129 (1958), reprinted in LANDMARKS OF THE LAW (Henson ed. 1960).
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action to the totality of a situation may create a decisional or interpretive "field" which then permeates an opinion or an interpretation. Imagine, for comparison, the situation of a speeding driver. A
statute prohibits such driving and states that a person may speed only
if his license permits it. No such license has ever been granted.
Penalties are provided. Suppose the speeding driver kills a careful
pedestrian. How well would definitions similar to those in the Brown
majority opinion be received, definitions which make the entire statute
irrelevant?
Of course the jury might still determine that the driving was unreasonable by other evidence. They might then determine there was
no proximate cause if a reasonable driver could not avoid the impact.
Surely the jury's value judgment and fact finding would be affected
by the knowledge of the over-all legislative judgment and regulatory
program. 60 A court should be aware of such matters and so should interpreters. Most of the time we are left to speculate and look for
causal universals.61
RISK THEORIES DEVELOPED AND COMPARED

Duty v. Cause. We are ready now for the remainder of the Keeton
analysis. If defendant's conduct caused the damage, and if defendant
was negligent, still, according to Keeton, he will be liable only if his
negligence in fact caused the damage. We have seen via the statutory
analogy that the pivotal characterization is that of negligence (dutybreach). It is this evaluation which in Keeton's view provides the
major limits on what would otherwise be unlimited liability. The
courts limit liability often in terms of foreseeability of result, natural
and probable consequences, intervening and superseding causes, and
unforeseeable plaintiffs or hazards or interests. Keeton offers his
translation in the name of simplicity. Two key cases in this part of
the interpretation are Hill v. Winsor 62 and Carey v. Pure Distributing Corp.6 3 From the Hill case, 64 Keeton abstracts an "unreasonable

60. Proof of such a part (fact?) of the whole situation must turn on the
reaction to the whole. Compare a similar hypothetical, but involving intoxication
instead of speeding. There intoxication would doubtless so permeate the case as to
make the statute unnecessary. Probably an opposite reaction is what makes the
statute "inconsequential" to some interpreters of Brown.
61. Dissenting judge noted other situations where court did implement
statutes: unlighted car at night, child labor cases, failure to have fire escape.
62. 118 Mass. 251 (1875).
63. 133 Tex. 31, 124 S.W.2d 847 (1939).
64. Workers on the fender of a bridge, fender consisting of pilings driven into
stream bed. Defendant's tug allowed to drift against fender, catching plaintiff
between some pilings. Review of instructions and jury verdict for plaintiff.
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risk" which the jury could have found.65 If defendant was negligent,
it was because it was "obviously probable that injury in some form
would be caused to those who were at work on the fender."8 6 Therefore, the result was within the risk, since "it is not necessary that
injury in the precise form in which it in fact resulted should have
been foreseen."67
We need to see that a court has some discretion in the generality
of its description of the "unreasonable risk," as well as in the description of the consequences and of the way in which they happened. In
this case the court might conceivably have concluded that harm was
foreseeable only to men who had been at work on the fender, or more
acceptably, that it could not reasonably be foreseen that a workman
would be thrown from the top of a piling and caught between the
pilings.
Keeton, however, envisions some sort of built-in limits on this
range of discretion, coming apparently from a keen sensitivity to the
reasonable man standard. He nicely illustrates the problem with
the Carey case. 68 The court might have described the mechanism of
injury in such a way as to exclude it from the risk: the risk was from
injury by the rolling, bouncing can, not by the top of a can blown
off by pressure from within. Keeton approves the court's characterization in more general terms, apparently believing that almost everyone would concur, because in a generic even if not a specific sense, it
is the kind of injury which might reasonably have been expected.
The verdict as to Mrs. Carey's injuries was reversed. As Keeton
explains the court's conclusion, her injury was not within the risk.
Keeton emphatically rejects a foreseeability characterization, for that
term is not sufficiently precise. Almost anything imaginable is foreseeable. Not only must the result be foreseeable, it must be sufficiently
"material" to justify calling defendant's failure to guard against it
unreasonable.9 In other words, in this case, defendant was not negli-

65. Case discussed, Kx=rON 49-52.
66. Hill v. Winsor, 118 Mass. 251, 258 (1875).
67.

Id. at 259.

68. Defendant's truck carrying several ten-gallon cans, defectively fastened to
truck. Fastener came loose; one can fell and struck ground near plaintiff's "house
car." Top of can blasted off, struck Mr. Carey in head while he was resting outside
car. Mrs. Carey judged from commotion that he was being attacked, jumped
from bed, secured pistol, went to door, saw husband in bloody condition. Miscarriage. Special verdict on both injuries for plaintiffs on the negligence and
proximate cause issues. Case discussed in KEErON 53-56.
69. Several other authors support Keeton on the ambiguity of "foreseeable,"
but find similar ambiguity as to "risk." Fleming, op. cit. supra note 41, at 510;
Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, in PROssER, SLErmcr Topics IN TE LAW OF TORTS 191,
220 (1953)- now incorporated in Prosser hornbook; HART & HONORE 240-41.
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gent as to that consequence, so his negligence, as opposed to his con70
duct, did not cause that consequence.
In both of these cases, other translations are possible. If liability
is to be denied, Mrs. Carey's injuries could have been characterized
in terms of intervening cause, or perhaps of unforeseeable plaintiff.
Since Keeton uses the prerogative, we are free to say that the case
"really" must be translated into our own preferred description. We
can reasonably discuss it in terms of the female plaintiff's interest in
emotional tranquility and whether that did or should fall within the
scope of defendant's duty, thus taking the case out of the routine
of proximate cause and calling for a nonroutine discussion in policy
terms. We may say that it was not that defendant was reasonable with
regard to that injury, rather that he had no obligation or duty to be
reasonable.71 In the court's words, the injury was a result of "fright"
alone72 We may ignore other human causes which are not backed by
duties.

3

Leon Green, in line with his own simplification of proximate cause,
once said of the Hill case that there was no causal issue at all (he
would probably say the same of Carey).74 For him the major issue is
negligence, apparently the scope of duty aspect, whether a duty was
owed regarding plaintiff's interests. Yet a vitalization of the cold facts
abstraction of the commentators, from clues in the opinion itself, allows another interpretation. The major issue was whether the jury,
not the judge, was justified in finding the defendant negligent, that is,
70. Perhaps not so obvious is the ambiguity of the word "negligence" as it is
used in this sentence. Its range of reference runs from Keeton's narrow characterization to the whole of the continuum of conduct-omissions that may be brought
into discussion.
A colleague of Keeton disparages importing "risk" into causation, but finds
Keeton's other risk distinctions good decisional guides, Mansfield, Hart & Honore,

Causation in the Law -A Comment, 17 VAND. L. REV. 487, 519-23 (1964).
71. As in Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935), no duty
to prevent fright to mother re auto injury to her child. Cf. King v. Phillips, 1
Q.B. 429 (1953), duty but no proximate cause because fright too "remote." All
three cases treated together in GREEN, MALONE, PEDRICK, and RAHL, note 51
supra at 90-97. Consider duty owed to a "rescuer," Wagner v. International Ry.,
232 N.Y. 176, 133 N.E. 437 (1921).
72. Dialectically speaking, since the court itself did not deny duty-breach,
liability could be rested on direct causation. Cf., Ehrgott v. Mayor of the City of
New York, 96 N.Y. 264 (1884) or manipulated to be foreseeable; cf., Hines v.
Morrow, 236 S.W. 183 (Civ. App. Tex. 1921); or of course unforeseeable, Mauney v.
Gulf Refining Co., 193 Miss. 421, 9 So. 2d 780 (1942), woman hurt in running from
area of service station fire. See Fleming and Prosser, supra note 69.
73. "Cause" and "duty" are correlative terms. Potentially a court may make
an actor the cause of an injury simply by imposing a duty upon him to prevent

such harm.
74. GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE 86 (1927); i.e., he would not use
causal language in debating the solution of the case.
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unreasonable. In his analysis, Keeton assumes that negligence as a
fact. Yet the evidence was at best fuzzy on that point. It was not
clear whether any one person who had control over the tug knew
there were any workmen at all on the pilings, let alone plaintiff. A
jury may say that such a person should have known, or the court may
say more strongly that the defendant master does know everything
its servants know. How important it would be for a practicing lawyer
to see this aspect of this precedent, the possibility of a corporate
"fault" which under the circumstances and the state of evidence is
75
difficult to characterize as culpable in the purely individualistic sense.
In its early days, the Restatement of Torts would characterize
these cases in causal terms which would be scorned today by both
Keeton and Green.7 6 Today the Restatement offers an alternative
characterization which it indicates should be used in such cases as Hill
and Carey. This is in line with what the Restatement regards as a
modern and more realistic trend. The analysis is not identical but related to the technique which Leon Green has promoted for over three
decades,7r that is, to shift the risk argument to the area of duty and
away from a causation discussion. While Green and Keeton seem to
have considerable agreement on the simple cause in fact question,
Green's simplification of proximate cause would be to divert the
78
hodge-podge of other issues to the duty-breach complex.
Why does Keeton reject the Restatement recommendation?79 It is
anything but an activist organization. The shift in terminology
seems, as it does with Green, to be also in terms of risk. The battle
seems one only of definitions. In this respect, Keeton has a point
when he says there is no inherent superiority in the use of dutybreach instead of cause.8 0 As a matter of logic, they are equally valid.
75. Compare the approach exemplified by Malone.
76. REsrATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS §§430-61 (1965). KEzrON 38-41; GREEN 573.
77. GREEN, op. cit. supra note 74; REsrATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS §§281, 431
(1965), especially comments "e" and "h" to §281 (discussed in KESrON 131 as
comments "e" and "ee" to §281 of the 1948 Supplement to the Restatement). Significantly, the recommended change, first appearing in the 1948 Supplement, took
place without alteration of the black letter of §281. While it sounds much like
Keeton's preferred fault-risk analysis, "causation" is purportedly not involved in
comment "h," only determination whether defendant was negligent with respect
to the particular hazards that were involved.
78. GRE.E_, op. cit. supra note 74; Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 Micu. L. Riv. 542 (1962).
79. Apparently he accepts this shift as to "persons within the risk," KEETON

79-86, but not results within the risk. The strength of his reactions may be
gauged by his comments: "a wavering system of rules." Id. at 36. See also id. at 96
where he explains his acquiescence as an Advisor but not agreement with the
Restatement and its Reporter. For the Reporter's own view of the relation between
duty and proximate cause see PROSsER 282.
80. "Choice cannot be made on purely analytic grounds." KEETON at 81, ap-
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To the master of the syntax it makes no difference. Within the
negligence dialectic it is quite as possible to hold a defendant liable
without any fault 8 ' as it is to relieve him even if his conduct is abhorrent. 82 The burden of liability may be closely geared to culpability83 or not.84 Even though a legal terminology is being used which
shares a heritage with a moral terminology, the one may be used
today for different ends from the other.85 Does anyone really believe
that terms like "foreseeable" or "risk" or "proximate" or "duty" 8or "cause" - can possibly guarantee any tighter kind of reference? 6
While they are wielded in a mathematical way, even mathematical
terms in their application take their values from the very context of
decision (or "application").
Yet there are not many who have had or have taken the opportunity to become masters in any conscious way of this complex syntax. Few judges have the time for such a specialty. We must attempt
to gain their perspective to see what difference these variant definitions may in practice make.87
The very matter has recently been debated in the Supreme Court
of Oregon among the judges and among attorneys. 88 This was a dramatic occasion, resulting in a set of opinions which may well become
parently criticizing drafters of Restatement.
81. By use of res ipsa loquitur, for instance, Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,
24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944), later to become strict liability in Greenman
v. Yuba Products, Inc., 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1962). See EHRENZWEIG,
NEGLIGENCE WITHOUT FAULT (1951) and analysis of separate fault in Hill v. Winsor,
notes 64-67 supra and accompanying text.
82. Kuhn v. Banker, 133 Ohio St. 304, 13 N.E.2d 242 (1938), discussed in
Green, supra note 77, at 558; Malone at 84. See dissenting judge's opinion in
Brown v. Shyne, 242 N.Y. 176, 151 N.E. 197 (1926).
83. Palsgraf v. Long Island Ry., 248 N.Y. 339, 133 N.E. 437 (1928).
84. Andrews' dissent in Palsgraf, ibid; Smith v. London & S.W. Ry., 6 C.P.
14 (1870). Culpability may even be suppressed as a vital issue, Ryan v. New York
Cent. R.R., 35 N.Y. 210 (1866).
85. The law-morality problem transcends by far our proximate cause problem,
but this is a good area for exemplification. See HART & HONORE, ch. 3; cf. CAHN,
THE MORAL DECISION (1955); HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY (1963). "Fault"
as Keeton uses the term is only one aspect of morality. F.S. Cohen, Modern Ethics
and the Law, in THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE 17 (1960).
86. F.S. Cohen, op. cit. supra note 4; Stone, Man and Machine in the Search
for Justice, 16 STAN. L. REV. 515 (1964); KORZYBSKI, SCIENCE AND SANITY (4th ed.
1958). All discuss the subtle aspects of our language in use, which hides the very
process of decision in its seeming routine use. Stone raises questions about the
impact of automation on decision making and the prediction of it. This article
bears out his thesis and adds that interpretation in a democratic society is still
too variant to be caught by a machine.
87. Keeton agrees that available choice of theories gives practical consequences,
KEETON at 81.
88. Dewey v. A. F. Klaveness & Co., 233 Ore. 515, 379 P.2d 560 (1963).
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of historic significance. There seems to have been a majority of the
court which would have affirmed the jury verdict, in any event. Yet
a rehearing was ordered to determine whether the problems should
be characterized in terms of duty-breach or in terms of proximate
cause. Amicus curiae briefs were requested to be representative of
both plaintiff and defendant advocates. The dissenting opinion remained Bealistic, in the older terminology of the earlier Restatement.
The three-judge majority opinion was cast also in terms of proximate
cause, perhaps somewhat less Bealistic, suggesting at least an open
mind on the question. Three judges, represented by Justice O'Connell in his concurring opinion, supported a lengthy analysis which
hewed closely to the Green proposals.8 9 The opinion supports what
has been spelled out here, that analysis in terms of proximate cause
tends to suppress articulation of policy which is of social significance.
Also at stake is the shaping of the very dynamics of decision-making
in the trial court and on the appellate level. That, in a nutshell, is
what all the commentators are debating.
Judges and Jury. The relationships among the decision makers
constitutes a variable which is much too often ignored in the debate
over principles and in the variation of interpretations of specific
opinions. Attention to this variable discloses yet another interpretation of Hill v. Winsor,9° for instance. While the case was not remanded for a new trial, the trial court's instructions and the appellate court's reasoning are not necessarily in close harmony. While
the trial court had treated the causal issue as important, the appellate
court gave the issue minimal attention. The jury conceivably could
have found negligence in the sense of the Andrews formulation in the
Palsgraf case 91 under the instructions, and then have found cause
also in the Andrews sense, in the chain of events view.92 The language
of the appellate court seems to be in the Keeton camp. Yet, since the
trial court was approved, where is the mandate for later trials? It may
be that the appellate court did not place as much stock in the significance of instructions as we do today. If an appellate court can find a
89. A third judge concurred only to the extent that he recognized proximate
cause as deceptive-he would wait and watch. Id. at 545, 379 P.2d at 575.
90. The variable entered in an analysis of Ehrgott v. Mayor of the City of
New York, 96 N.Y. 264 (1884) and Brown v. Shyne, 242 N.Y. 176, 151 N.E. 197
(1926). By and large social scientists are not sensitive to this variable.
91. Palsgraf v. Long Island Ry., 248 N.Y. 339, 133 N.E. 437 (1928).
92. In PRossER (2d ed.) Hill is interpreted at 173 as a direct causation case
and at 261 as liability beyond the risk. In PROSSER (3d ed.), it is a case that the
man in the street would regard as highly unusual and it gave birth to the
Keeton kind of analysis at 307. Clearly this is a Prosser with a new frame of
reference, so far as causation is concerned, as evidenced in many changes in his
treatment of the subject.
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good reason for affirming a jury and if the jury was not given arbitrary instructions, the court may justify the jury's findings. Such a
permissive attitude may not be as unusual as it seems. Such an opinion, arguably, does not set forth a rule, it adds to the totality of available arguments. In short, it demonstrates a reviewing function not
just a law-stating function. 93
If that is where the Green analysis necessarily led, that would, in
Keeton's view, be reason enough for rejecting it, for in his mind,
94
juries are being given too much discretion in tort cases generally.
Actually, Green seems more to agree with Keeton. He apparently
believes that the traditional proximate cause approach confuses the
functions of judges and juries. 95 One of the strongest planks of his
recommendation is that duty and scope of duty have traditionally
been regarded as judicial questions. What has formerly been given
to the jury with little or no instructions should be handled articulately by the judges, or with clearer guidance, by the jury. The trial
judge and ultimately the appellate courts would have the power to
make policy decisions when they need to or want to. And we may
add, do so in policy terms.
Courts have demonstrated their ability to exercise such an authority with the proximate cause concept too. 96 They did so in the
Carey case directing a verdict against plaintiff with regard to Mrs.
Carey's damages. Yet the case also demonstrates that cogent and
obvious policy matters are not articulated, possibly because a court
takes "causation" too seriously. We must not forget, however, that
even though the line between judge and jury functions is thus harder
to see or draw, many judges may prefer it that way. Proximate cause
cases, even the seemingly routine ones, recall, are often hard cases,
and rhyme or reason is presently difficult to find. As it stands, decisions of this kind are difficult to criticize except for their lack of
clarity, and the jury may crack the hard nut of how far to extend
liability.
93. Cf., Mauney v. Gulf Refining Co., 193 Miss. 421, 9 So. 2d 780 (1942). Trial
court dismissed case for break in causal chain, appellate court affirmed for lack
of foreseeability. Such a practice is worthy of further inquiry.
94. KvaroN at 98; Green at 561.
95. Green at 563, citing Justice Smith in majority opinion of Elbert v. City of
Saginaw, 363 Mich. 463, 109 N.W.2d 879 (1961), where duty approach was preferred: new trial. See also Justice O'Connell in Dewey v. A. F. Kiaveness & Co.
233 Ore. 515, 379 P.2d 560 (1963).
96. E.g., Pfeifer v. Standard Gateway Theatre, 262 Wis. 229, 55 N.W.2d 29
(1952), Justice Currie would have the court consider difficult policy questions.
Also King v. Phillips, 1 Q.B. 429 (1953), doing with proximate cause what another
court said must be done with duty, Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W.
497 (1935). Even if the duty complex is used, the problems can be passed to the
jury as a breach of duty question.
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Controlling Principles. We come to another dilemma which Keeton and others may wish to avoid. How much control can you give
to judges without giving them too much? 97 To those who think in
terms of transcendent or neutral or controlling principles, "the law"
itself is a key if not the main variable in decision and in interpretation. 98 In this view, we may readily see that Keeton would promote
principles by which we may judge the judges, principles so missing in
the present condition of proximate cause. The critic who will set
forth such principles must either have the power to enforce them or
be on the side of the angels in justifying them. Again, it seems on the
surface, at least, that the shift to duty, risk, and scope of duty would
serve as well as a shift to duty, breach, risk, and legal cause. The
answer must be that Keeton is judging the logic by the policies, or
seeming lack of them, of the champion of the shift.
Leon Green and his writings dramatize the deeper divergencies.
They disclose a position which supports a broader base of liability.9a
Green, if he is not slightly irreverent of controlling principles, is apparently not sufficiently submissive to them. He has elsewhere, and
for the same reasons, been called "atomistic" in his approach. 00 It
will always be remembered by the older contemporary proponents
of controlling principles that Green was a pioneer legal realist, some
what akin to being subversive. That is a view that was and is regarded by many sophisticated observers as at worst a tool of chaos
and amorality and at best the open door to a runaway judiciary.01
Some contemporary realists might respond that make-believe or per97.

Keeton, Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75 HARv. L. REv. 463

(1962).
98. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Common Law, 73 HARV. L. Rxv.
1 (1959). Socio-realists tend to slight the "reality" of "law" itself, Miller & Howell,
The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 27 U. CHI. L. Rlv. 501
(1959). Each of us has a large area of "reality," which is "illusion" to someone
else. Compare the fact-value disagreement.
99. K=EON at 72, calls Green an "advocate of an expanded tort liability and
critic of the Risk Rule .... " So far as the court's functions are concerned, Green
is not an activist by today's standards. Cf., as to changes to be legislatively implemented, GaRN, TRAsrxc VIcrIMs (1958).
100. HART & HONoRE at 256; supported by Mansfield, note 70 supra. Yet compare HART 8-- HONoRE and their approach to the statutory negligence cases: note
48 supra and accompanying text. Cole believes Green is not sufficiently analytical,
Cole at 464, 472.
101. Arnold, Frank, Llewellyn, and Rodell were more extreme realists, but
their program was not an abandonment of any morality. See GARLAN, LEGAL
REALisM AD JusTIcE 3-14 (1941). Today's most extreme realists so far as their
view of courts is concerned are Messrs. Lasswell and McDougal, but they too look
for transcendental principles; see McDougal, Book Review, 50 YALE LJ. 827
(1941), although they probably would not care for that terminology; BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE 140 (1962).
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sonal principles are a poor substitute for live judges who are fully
conscious of the consequences of their decisions.
Yet it may be that the principles of each view are of two different
kinds, evolved by a different technique. In this respect, the pivotal
difference between the Green and Keeton approaches is seen in their
definitions of risk. Green would use the term in a way that has at
least as good a pedigree as the Keeton preference. The confusion
comes in believing that the term necessarily must have reference only
to the perspective of the "reasonable man."' 0 2 In addition, the term
has economic significance as well as moral and personal injury connotations. Some commentators see tort decisions as involving a translation of a variety of losses into economic equivalencies. Then another overriding consideration appears: the proper allocation of such
economic risks.1° 3 It is possible to define the term "risk" in negligence
law in such a way as to be open although not committed to that
policy question and open to other important values as well. Green
has opened the door in negligence law to such a comprehensive value
approach. 04
Each tort case, certainly of the kind we have been interpreting,
involves risks. As Green sees it, the problem of decision in a negligence case, often best decided as a scope of duty question rather than
a proximate cause question, is to allocate those risks. 05 A plaintiff
in a negligence case claims a loss. To a completely rugged individualist, that is one of the risks of life. Plaintiff seeks to shift the particular risk, now only in an economic sense, to defendant. If defendant
acted and in fact caused plaintiff's loss, he affords plaintiff the oppor102. Green at 567. The following textual analysis of risk is not represented as
a paraphrase of Green's view, although the views are believed to be harmonious.
Definition in terms of "primary" and "secondary" risks is meant to tie into the
writer's sanctioning analysis. Probert, supra note 54, at 292-311.
103. Economic considerations of considerable complexity are elaborately discussed pro and con in Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law
of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961); C. R. Morris, Jr., Enterprise Liability and the

Actuarial Process- The Insignificance of Foresight, 70 YALE L.J. 554 (1961). More
clearly preferential positions are taken in HARPER & JAME-S and by Ehrenzweig in
his writings. See, e.g., EHRENZWEIG, NEGLIGENCE WITHOUT FAULT (1951). See
bibliographic reference in Calabresi, supra at 499 n.2.
104. As indicated, "risk" is highly variant in reference. We need to be
especially careful to distinguish between "spreading of risk" in the economic
mechanism sense, and "allocation of risks" in the risks of activity sense or in the
even broader total vlaues of life sense. In the sense of economic risks, Calabresi,
note 103 supra, distinguishes the impact tort judgments may have on the immediate
wealth positions of the parties from the impact on the ultimate allocation of resources in the community. We might also trace values other than economic ones.
See Probert, Creative Judicial Sanctioning: Application in the Law of Torts, 49
IOWA L. REv. 277, 294-304 (1964).
105. Green at 567-69.
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tunity to argue by various means that it is now proper for him to
share in plaintiff's misfortune. Such are the primary risks which a
court by decision, allocates in a specific case. Hopefully this is done
in accord with meaningful principles and not necessarily fault alone.
These primary risks of the case are allocated, however, against a
social background and courts necessarily act beyond the confines of a
specific case. In such a specific case, a court may take into account
the risks that generally are associated with driving cars or cargo-laden
trucks which may run into or otherwise injure people, whether pedestrians or not. There are risks predictably associated with other
activities, say an industry, a fishing industry, for instance; or in
shooting guns; or in performing some public service such as the practice of medicine or one of the related fields; or in handling fires; or
in providing and maintaining public roads or in shipping or carrying
goods; and so on. 0 6 As these risks of loss become in fact losses and
appear in court, the court may consider for the future how these
risks ought to be allocated, economically, as they occur. Persons in
these activities may thus be put on notice of the economic risks they
take and they may well seek ways of absorbing them or avoiding
them. It may indeed then be unreasonable not to do so. 0 7 Thus it
08
is that courts allocate risks also in a secondary sense.1
We have thus moved into a kind of an analysis which has been
called functional in nature. Some regard the approach as more socially oriented. The syntax of negligence can readily be adopted by
its masters and argued in such functional terms by its advocates, when
they are ready. Even "fault" is adaptable in its subtleties by a kind of
new wine in old bottles approach so characteristic still, at least of our
negligence approach. Green has not come to the point of articulating
the variant policies which may be involved in various areas of activity.
106.

The language of the text is in terms of key cases analyzed in this article.

For others, see GREEN,

MALONE,

PEDRICK,

and

RAHL,

TORTS (1957); particularly

Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Marshall, 222 Fed. 2d 604 (Ist Cir. 1955).
107. Keeton, Conditional Fault in the Law of Torts, 72 HARV. L. REV. 401
(1959).
108. The value-risk suggestions of the text are not so variant from the Keeton
fault-risk analysis as they may seem. Cf., HA"ER & JAMEs at 1151, viewing the
fault-risk analysis as a bridge between liability based on fault and strict liability.
Strict liability may often be only a different way of talking: Probert, Speaking of
Torts, 49 Ky. L. J. 114 (1960); at least in period of transition. Actually, the Harper
and James preference for risk-spreading is as individualistic as the old fault view,
but plaintiff instead of defendant oriented. It does not involve the full value analysis suggested in the text. See Calabresi, note 103 supra. Keeton must see all
this; but he would slow down the socially shifting values when they get to court,
note 107 supra. It is not so dear that he sees that contrary views which call attention to the shift or set forth a different preference are not a desertion of all
principles. They are just opposing principles: KEETON at viii.
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Yet on this route to principle, such policies must be articulated before
meaningful transcendent principles can be discovered, if they do
exist in practice, if they may be posited even ideally.
Short of that day of greater articulation, the Green approach
may indeed seem chaotic. As has been suggested, there is much less
of atomism, and more of pragmatism, than at first contact appears.
However it appears, Green is not just the disciple of an ad hoc approach. His limits are found in the dynamics of our society, the legal
institutions generally, and the judiciary in particular.109 As it turns
out, Keeton may be even more faulted on his own terms. "Fault" and
so his "risk" are terms which are socially adaptable, but in the present
stage of nonarticulation, mostly on an intuitive basis.110 He has
created only a seeming certainty, only a seeming restriction. Once you
have determined what risks the defendant is responsible for, then
under Keeton's analysis you may determine if he is the legal cause.
Yet may it not be that he has simply cast the whole of the decisional
problem into the major reaches of the arena and backed himself into
a small albeit certain corner?"'
CONCLUSION

Perhaps there are routine fact situations in which causation presents no problem. That cannot be proved, only inferred. To say
"If A hits B in the nose and B's nose bleeds, then A caused the nosebleed" only seems routine. That is only an abstracted portion of some
larger problem situation; we have not seen where that problem begins and ends. You cannot adequately chart life problems on paper.
Yet assume causation, for we will rebel at any other thought. That
other part of legal realism, that existential component, has not survived our overpowering rationality and heavy handed intellectualism.
We dare not be poetic about such matters as causation. Yet we may
dare to wonder if even the case which is routine in its causal element
is necessarily routine in all its elements. A routine case is one that
109. Green at 568.
110. Noted by Justice O'Connell in Dewey v. A. F. Klaveness & Co., 233 Ore.
515, 529, 379 P.2d 560, 567 (1963). Thus what seems to be a faith in rationality
is very far from contemporary notions of rationality outside the law. Miller &
Howell, note 98 supra. Keeton does admit that at least risk is an evaluation for
which the reasons are not articulated, KEETON at 57. Cole seems to have provided
a route to a contemporary functional analysis, although the analysis seems a bit
one-sided, on the order of English positivism, short of the warm blood of a
psycho-logical rather than merely logical perspective.
111. He may recognize that his certainty, if any, is a small one, KEETON at 24.
His effort may be to achieve not so much certainty in decision but in the terminology that will be used. In light of contemporary semantic sophistication, such
an effort is of dubious necessity.
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is treated routinely. Cause becomes important in that view when it
is a means either of avoiding routine solution or a means of subduing the devil case into a routine appearance.
Few, if any, of our commentators will long entertain such a premise as basic, yet their causal profiles will show varying degrees of
such an ad hoc component, as well as of the transcendental, no doubt
in inverse proportion -2 The very word "law," more symbol than
word, in our heritage requires more than lip service to the transcendental component. It must appear as a basic premise. We need not regard the matter as only of faith, or less, as illusion, to see it as a touch
or more of idealism - and yet the only provable sine qua non of our
subject. We are agreed on paper, and probably more, that law and
so proximate cause to some extent transcends the individual court,
or commentator, or case.
Beyond that, our views are so divergent there is little immediate
hope for a shared interpretive method, let alone common definitions
or, certainly, common goals. We do not see in common even how the
judicial process works, or how it ought to work, although that does
not prevent us from working within it. In the causal debate we have
seen that some worry more about controlling the common law, lest
perhaps it control us, than others do about freeing the process for
"policy" implementation. Some believe it is feasible to place faith in
verbal guides, others in some contemporary living law notion: patterns of conditioning.
In this area, little of modern scientific method has been suggested,
other than an assumption that generalizations make sense and the
demonstration of the principle of parsimony in the attempt to simplify. Some move closer to the model of empiricism than others. Yet if
we really seek meaningful generalities that will give us predictability
we would have come much closer to the facts and other variables of
litigation than we have. The preceding analysis should at least suggest that point. Not only do we let our facts grow cold, but we ignore
largely the dynamics of decision. We ignore in an amazing degree
what we have learned about the language variables. Certainly that
has been demonstrated here. While we do not have the means at
hand to observe in any large scale what impact causal decisions have
on the parties to the decision or on some or all of the rest of society,

112. The phase of legal realism which involved an emphasis upon the ad hocs
and the nonrational is now being brought to bear upon lawyer roles and opera-

tions, where perhaps it is more tolerable, at least to nonlawyers. See, e.g., FREE(1964); WEYRAUCH, THE PERSONALITY OF
LAWYERs (1964); Brown, The Law Office-A Preventive Law Laboratory, 104 U.
PA. L. REV. 940 (1954); Watson, Psychiatry for Lawyers (mimeo, 1957) (unpublished teaching material).
mAN, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELLING
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we do blessed little in speculating on the matter. We let our intuitions bear the burden of giving that sort of content to our otherwise
a prioriprinciples.
What appears as criticism is meant more as a prelude to the suggestion that we not pretend to more than we have done or can do.
What we have done is not therefore useless, although we may hope
for some increased evolution if not progress in our techniques and
even our terminology - once we become convinced that "cause" cannot in and of itself long be the constant of our hope.
In this vein, the Green and Malone efforts come the closest to any
immediately usable scientific or descriptive needs." 3 Such efforts
should prove the most meaningful in the lawyers' search for close precedent. They should be more meaningful to a judge who would reflect on cause in the context of his role. The policy-oriented individual will find much more to his liking here, or at least a smattering
of sympathy. He may find these efforts to be more tracks in the thicket
than durable trails, even if they are the only clearings we have made.
Some of the other commentators provide more of the popularizations, the surface and going language of courts." 4 We learn from
them what is indispensable to advocacy, professionalism, exams, and
lectures. We will no more give that aspect away than we can rid
ourselves of causation, in both its factual and value aspects. (Were
we to drop the word, some other similar notion would rise in its
place.) Keeton, like Green and Malone, fights this popular tide. He
is a law reformer, but of a socially conservative nature. The lawyer
can use his translation-preferences and the technique to a considerable
advantage. He must be regarded less a scientist than a critic, a critic
with a Cardozo touch and view-more of Cardozo, at least, than
Beale.
Do not regard this as a Pollyanna turn. We stand confused all the
same. We will remain confused until we come ready to be more candid about our goals so that we may decide what they are to be. There
113. As of this writing, the Cole analysis was not completed. His suggestions
certainly are also scientifically oriented and more operational than the BECHT &
MILLER effort at scientific analysis. It is curious that Cole does not recognize the
functional ground which Leon Green plowed. That again may be because of his
preference for the English type of analysis rather than the psychological analysis
of the older legal realism and the current socio-realism.
114. All the commentators at least give lip service to policy along with the
professionally popular terminology. Of the three leading authorities, the Restatement shows the least policy orientation, HARPER & JAMES the most, PROSSER
now fairly close, so far as causation is concerned. Still, the new Prosser on causation
does not justify the statement that in this area broad conceptions of policy are
best seen in his works. Contra, HART & HONORE at 99-100. "Policy" as used here
does not refer to shoulder shrugging or intuition. Rarely do the commentators
get down to concrete social policy consideration. But see Cole generally.
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is less excuse now than there ever was for merely smuggling these
goals under old names, at least less excuse in the critical literature.
We continue to allow that freedom to our judges, although they too
overdo it. For them and for us, the most important need is not a
theory of causation which tells us what judges do, even though we
have no really comprehensive theory that does even that."n What we
need is a theory of causation which tells us what judges ought to do,
and that must be socially and morally responsive.1 6 Keeton, like most
of us of legal bent, has dressed his oughts in false clothes. But most
of all, he has made our other common error. He has assumed that
11 7
a valid theory of criticism can be found in the opinions themselves.
But we are the ones who must develop it. A realistic interpretative
technique, realistic not just in its fidelity to the goings on in court,
but also to the goings on in the world around the court, may aid in
that development." 8

115. While his view tends to be ad hoc, Malone provides a beginning model
for serious policy analysis, even though he sees juries as ultimate policy-reactors.
116. The pioneer efforts are those of F.S. Cohen, Field Theory and Judicial
Logic, 59 YALE L.J. 238 (1950), apparently reaching only Malone at 62. Otherwise
tort commentators in general but not universally remain blissfully unaware or
uninterested in the insights which may come from jurisprudential writings. Hart
and Honore present much of value in this regard, even if not always quotable in
court or if not very often simple in their "clarification." Cole seems to bring jurisprudential theory to bear in his analysis, although he tends to omit reference to
its literature.
117. Keeton is particularly guilty of crypto-idealism, F.S. COHEN, ETHICAL
SYsTEms AND LEGAL IDEALS (1933), excerpted in COHEN & COHEN, READINGS IN
JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 640-44 (1951); or more broadly, of scrambling
a variety of perspectives into language that purports to be descriptive; MoRIs,
SIGNS, LANGUAGE, AND BEHAVIOR (1946).
118. Contemporary "realism" is different from that of earlier days. See Stone,
note 86 supra. Shapiro, Political Jurisprudence, 52 Ky. L. J. 294 (1964). So is
transcendentalism. See Wechsler, note 98 supra.
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